provenance of this document



Hugh's diary entry - B52s on alert - 2003 Feb 05 Wednesday


Hugh's diary entry - entry for the analysis of this report.



 
                         REPORT ON NORTH KOREA

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 4, 1999

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, North Korea policy is undoubtedly one of
this country's most pressing foreign policy challenges. With the
discovery of a secret underground nuclear weapons-related facility and
the launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong ballistic missile over our
troops and allies in Asia, our policy towards North Korea has been
called into serious question. And rightfully, so.
  Today, I received a copy of a study done by a working group of Asia
experts under the able guidance of former Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Armitage. The National Defense University Strategic
Forum ``A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea'' is a timely and
insightful study which will add much to the ongoing debate about the
direction of our policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.
  I commend this report to my colleagues and the foreign and defense
policy community and ask that they give due consideration to the
report's findings and recommendation as we work together to craft a
policy which protects and advances American interests on the Korean
peninsula.
  Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I ask that the National Defense
University's Strategic Forum Number 159 of March 1999 be inserted at
this point in the Congressional Record:

 [National Defense University, Strategic Forum, Number 159, March 1999]

                A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea

                      (By Richard L. Armitage) \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     \1\ Ambassador Richard L. Armitage is President of Armitage
     Associates and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
     International Security Affairs. He chaired a working group on
     U.S. Policy Toward North Korea whose members included:
     Johannes A. Binnendijk, Institute for National Strategic
     Studies; Peter T.R. Brookes, House Committee on International
     Relations; Carl W. Ford, Ford and Associates; Kent M.
     Harrington, Harrington Group L.L.C.; Frank S. Jannuzi,
     Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
     Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; RADM Michael
     A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Center for Naval Analyses; James J.
     Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies; GEN
     Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.), L-3 Communications
     Corporation; and Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze
     School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins
     University.
     Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or
     implied in this paper are solely those of the working group
     and do not represent the views of the National Defense
     University, the Department of Defense, or any other
     government agency or nongovernment organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signed by the United
     States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security
     situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has
     changed qualitatively for the worse. The discovery last year
     of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31
     launch of a Taepo Dong missile have combined to raise
     fundamental questions about Pyongyang's intentions, its
     commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-
     South reconciliation. These developments also raise profound
     questions about the sustainability of current U.S. policy
     toward the Korean peninsula.
       The Agreed Framework successfully addressed a specific
     security problem--North Korea's plutonium production at the
     Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement,
     operations were frozen at the two facilities and Pyongyang
     was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel
     rods of the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons. Had
     the program continued unabated, North Korea might have been
     able to produce enough fissile material for a substantial
     nuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a
     necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple
     security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the
     development of the Taepo Dong missile poses an expanding
     security threat to Northeast Asia and, increasingly, to the
     Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself.

                          Changing Assumptions

       Experience in dealing with Pyongyang since the Agreed
     Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions
     on which public and Congressional support for U.S. policy has
     been based.
       The first is the assumption made by some senior
     administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended
     North Korea's nuclear program.
       The second is that North Korea is a failed state on the
     verge of collapse and that a ``hard landing''--collapse
     perhaps accompanied by aggression--should be avoided.
       The third is that the Agreed Framework would induce North
     Korea to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual
     process of North-South reconciliation, and lead to real
     reform and a ``soft landing.''
       These assumptions suggested that, even if little progress
     was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed
     Framework was an effective, time-buying strategy. At a
     minimum, North Korea's conventional capabilities would
     continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the North
     would solve our problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting
     with the South. These assumptions are now open to question.

                             Reality Check

       The disclosure of at least one suspect site--on which
     construction began prior to the agreement--reinforces the
     possibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its
     nuclear program or is seeking to develop a covert nuclear
     weapons program. The Agreed Framework was structured to
     become stronger over time in constraining the

[[Page E342]]

     North's nuclear weapons capability. This meant deferring the
     requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into
     full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency
     (IAEA) full-scope safeguards until roughly 2002-03. In
     effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North
     Korea might have one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it
     is also possible that Pyongyang could have acquired
     additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material
     from external sources.
       Moreover, the core assumption of imminent collapse is
     seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no
     signs of regime-threatening social or political unrest, or
     military disaffection. As underscored in its 50th anniversary
     celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to
     have consolidated itself under Kim Jong Il.
       There are also no signs that the regime is contemplating
     any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by
     necessity, it is experimenting at the margins with modest
     reform to alleviate food shortages at the local level and
     gain hard currency. With Chinese aid and a variety of hard
     currency schemes--missile exports, counterfeiting, narcotics
     trafficking, selling overflight rights--the regime has been
     able to keep urban areas minimally functioning. By all
     appearances, the regime may be able to stagger on
     indefinitely.

commentary

       Starvation has not politically weakened the regime. As
     demonstrated in the cases of Ukraine under Stalin and China
     under Mao, there is not necessarily a connection between
     human misery and the stability of the regime in a
     totalitarian system. The regime has been willing to destroy
     an entire generation to preserve its power.
       At the same time, Pyongyang has spurned the political
     overtures of the most conciliatory president in the history
     of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jung. President Kim has
     written volumes on Korean unification, including plans for
     reunification that are similar to those offered by the late
     Kim Il Sung. The unwillingness to deal seriously with Kim Dae
     Jung suggests a fundamental fear that North-South
     reconciliation would undermine the legitimacy of the regime
     in Pyongyang.
       President Kim's Sunshine Policy (now known as the
     Engagement Policy) has established a formula for
     reconciliation on the peninsula, while deferring the ultimate
     goal of reunification as a practical matter. To date,
     Pyongyang has responded to Seoul's economic, social, and
     cultural nongovernmental overtures, but has rejected any
     political reconciliation with South Korea. Moreover, as
     evidenced by recent incidents of military infiltration, it
     continues its aggressive behavior.

                          Who Is Buying Time?

       The notion that buying time works in our favor is
     increasingly dubious. A growing body of evidence suggests
     that it is North Korea that is buying time--to consolidate
     the regime, continue its nuclear weapons program, and build
     and sell two new generations of missiles, while disregarding
     the well-being of its 22 million people. Kim Jung Il's
     assumption of the post of Chairman of North Korea's
     Military Commission has raised the influence of the armed
     forces. These developments have created an increasingly
     dangerous security environment in Northeast Asia.
       Indeed, North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the
     development of missile delivery systems have combined to pose
     an enhanced threat to the security of Japan. This threat has
     grown even as Japan has continued to support the Agreed
     Framework and its light-water reactor project. Yet we cannot
     expect Tokyo's continued support for approaches to Pyongyang
     that fail to address Japan's security concerns.
       North Korea's provocative actions and belligerent posture
     have challenged--and taken advantage of--our interest in
     stability. For Pyongyang, the lesson of the past four years
     is that brinkmanship works.

                     Foundation for a New Approach

       A Congressionally mandated review has made it clear that
     current policy toward North Korea is politically
     unsustainable. Similar political pressures are today evident
     in Japan and may soon surface in the Republic of Korea. The
     appointment of former Secretary of Defense William Perry to
     conduct a review of policy toward North Korea is an important
     step in fashioning a policy that is politically viable and
     protects the vital interests of the United States and its
     allies.
       A new approach must treat the Agreed Framework as the
     beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of
     the problem. It should clearly formulate answers to two key
     questions: first, what precisely do we want from North Korea,
     and what price are we prepared to pay for it? Second, are we
     prepared to take a different course if, after exhausting all
     reasonable diplomatic efforts, we conclude that no worthwhile
     accord is possible?
       Current policy is fragmented. Each component of policy--
     implementing the Agreed Framework, four-party peace talks,
     missile talks, food aid, POW-MIA talks--operates largely on
     its own track without any larger strategy or focus on how the
     separate pieces fit together. In the absence of a
     comprehensive policy, North Korea has held the initiative,
     with Washington responding as Pyongyang acts as demandeur.
       A successful approach to North Korea must be comprehensive
     and integrated, and must address the totality of the security
     threat. The stakes involved should make Korea a matter of the
     highest priority for the President. This will require
     sustained attention to manage the issue with Congress, our
     Korean and Japanese allies, and China. The diplomacy leading
     to the Agreed Framework had such focus when Robert Galucci
     was named special coordinator, reporting directly to the
     Secretary of State and the President. Unfortunately, after
     Ambassador Galucci left his Korea post in 1995, no successor
     was named.
       The logic of the policies pursued by the United States, its
     allies, and China has been one of muddling through. This has
     allowed North Korea to obtain economic benefits while
     maintaining its military threat. Given the opacity of North
     Korea's totalitarian regime, its decision-making process is
     unknowable.

commentary

     Only by fairly testing Pyongyang's intentions
     through diplomacy can we validate policy assumptions. If a
     diplomatic solution is not possible, it is to our advantage
     to discover this sooner rather than later in order to best
     protect our security interests. If North Korea leaves no
     choice but confrontation, it should be on our terms, not its
     own.

commentary

       One cannot expect North Korea to take U.S. diplomacy
     seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United
     States is prepared to bolster its deterrent military posture.
     This can be done without appearing to threaten Pyongyang. At
     the same time, policy should provide an adequate incentive
     structure to any forces inside the North Korean elite who may
     be inclined to believe that the least bad choice for survival
     is one of civil international behavior and opening. To
     convince the North to modify its posture, we need a larger
     conceptual framework, with greater incentives and
     corresponding disincentives.
       The first step toward a new approach is to regain the
     diplomatic initiative. U.S. policy toward North Korea has
     become largely reactive and predictable, with U.S. diplomacy
     characterized by a cycle of North Korean provocation (or
     demand) and American response. The intention is to be
     proactive and to define the agenda.
       This begins with setting new terms of reference. Diplomacy
     must fashion an initiative that integrates the entire
     spectrum of security challenges, while enhanced deterrence
     must address what we are prepared to do, should diplomacy
     prove inadequate.
       Our strategy must be closely coordinated with our allies.
     It must integrate Tokyo's interests and assets, as well as
     Seoul's Engagement Policy and defense capabilities. Such
     integration, at a minimum, would strengthen the U.S. alliance
     structure, while positioning Washington to deal more
     effectively with Pyongyang.
       A new approach to North Korea will necessarily test China's
     intentions. Beijing was helpful in the process leading to the
     Agreed Framework, and the United States publicly cites that
     cooperation as a major payoff of its China policy.
       But China is also pursuing its own agenda. Beijing is
     sustaining North Korea with aid, despite Pyongyang's apparent
     unwillingness to heed its advice. China has resisted active
     cooperation--with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
     Organization, with the World Food Program, and on missiles.
     Its independent actions pose a challenge to any successful
     U.S. policy. No approach to North Korea is likely to succeed
     absent some modicum of active cooperation from--and clear
     understanding with--China. Beijing must understand that it
     will either bear a burden for failure or benefit from
     cooperation.

          Operational Elements of A New Comprehensive Approach

commentary

       We would propose a new comprehensive approach for
     management of the problems posed by North Korea. The package
     should combine the elements of deterrence and diplomacy cited
     below. This package is not offered with any unwarranted
     optimism regarding what is possible vis-a-vis North Korea.
     Thus, the strengthening of deterrence is central to this
     package.
       To make a comprehensive approach sustainable politically,
     it is critical to start with and maintain close coordination
     with Congress. To be successful, policy toward the Korean
     peninsular requires a foundation of strong bipartisan
     support. A regular mechanism for executive-legislative
     interaction should be developed. The former Senate Arms
     Control Observer Groups on U.S.-Soviet relations can serve as
     a model.
       To protect U.S. and allied interests, a strengthening of
     deterrence must support diplomacy. Deterrence depends
     essentially on the proper blend of diplomacy, declaratory
     policy, and demonstrable military capability. As a result, if
     diplomacy fails, North Korea should be faced with the
     consequences of its choice: isolation or containment in an
     environment in which U.S. leadership and alliance structures
     have been reinvigorated and strengthened, allowing the United
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan to act together.
       The following steps are critical to bolstering credible
     deterrence.
       The United States should encourage Japanese leaders to
     accelerate the timetable for Guidelines Legislation, and to
     underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to
     Tokyo's security interests in the region and beyond.
       The United States should call for a trilateral (the United
     States, Republic of Korea, and Japan) defense ministers
     consultative meeting to address a range of peninsula
     contingencies. In particular, this meeting

[[Page E343]]

     should consider actions to implement force enhancement
     options, which might include agreements to increase counter-
     battery radar around Seoul and deploy more Patriot batteries
     to Japan from Europe and the continental United States.
     Public statements should also focus on deepening missile
     defense cooperation, as well as a spectrum of military
     exercises to deal with a variety of North Korean actions.

commentary

       ``Red Lines'' should be drawn. The United States, together
     with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should clarify what is
     unacceptable behavior and underscore that provocative
     military action by North Korea will not be tolerated and will
     provoke a response.
       The Pentagon should undertake a review of the American
     presence in South Korea, not with a view to reduction, but to
     ensure that U.S. forces can optimally deal with the evolving
     nature of the North Korean threat.
       As a separate but related action, the Pentagon and the
     commander in chief of Combined Forces Command in the Republic
     of Korea should conduct a review to determine what mix of
     surveillance, radar, and other weapons is required to improve
     the defense of Seoul against bombardment or surprise attack.
     To underscore alliance commitments, the United States should
     also announce that it is prepared to augment forces in
     theater.
       To enhance the prospects for the comprehensive package and
     to advance U.S. and allied interests, diplomacy must be
     closely coordinated with Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.
       The U.S. point person should be designated by the President
     in consultation with Congressional leaders and should report
     directly to the President. This step also aims to move the
     issue to the highest possible level of decisionmaking in
     North Korea.
       Diplomacy should seek to align South Korean and Japanese
     policies to influence positively North Korean behavior as
     well as to reinforce military deterrence.
       The United States should propose a trilateral (United
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan) foreign minister-
     level consultative meeting. The goals should be to name high-
     level point persons, establish coordinating mechanisms, and
     raise the issue to the level of a presidential national
     security priority. Trilateral coordination should reach
     understandings on a division of responsibilities for the
     comprehensive proposal.
       China's active cooperation is vital. Because the United
     States and China share common interests with respect to the
     Korean peninsula, we expect China to act in a positive
     manner. Active cooperation will enhance Sino-American
     relations. However, if conflict occurs as a result of
     inadequate cooperation, Beijing will bear a heavy
     responsibility. Moreover, the burden of keeping North Korea
     on ``life support'' will fall squarely on China if our
     diplomatic initiative fails.

                       The Comprehensive Package

       United States objectives should be maintaining and as
     necessary strengthening deterrence, and eliminating through
     peaceful means the military threat posed by North Korean
     nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and
     missiles. Our goal is to reduce the risks to the United
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. To the extent the
     threat cannot be eliminated, the goal is to contain the
     residual threat. In addition, the United States seeks to
     facilitate South-North reconciliation.

commentary

       Washington should table an offer that meets Pyongyang's
     legitimate economic, security, and political concerns. This
     would allow the United States to seize the diplomatic
     initiative as well as the moral and political high ground. It
     would also strengthen the ability to build and sustain a
     coalition if North Korea does not cooperate. Most
     importantly, the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be
     demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang.

commentary

       The objective of negotiations should be to offer Pyongyang
     clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand,
     economic benefits, security assurances, political
     legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced
     military deterrence. For the United States and its allies,
     the package as a whole means that we are prepared--if
     Pyongyang meets our concerns--to accept North Korea as a
     legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of
     relations.
       Negotiations would address the following:
       1. The Agreed Framework: We should make clear our intention
     to honor existing commitments, but also underscore that the
     political and security environments have deteriorated
     significantly since October 1994 because of North Korea's
     actions. To sustain support for the agreement, it is
     imperative that the issues regarding the suspect site(s) and
     missiles be addressed.
       Sites: We should note that suspect sites are covered in the
     ``confidential minute'' to the Agreed Framework. Our
     objective is to have a credible mechanism to increase on-
     going transparency of the present site--but not be limited to
     that site. The United States should make it clear in a
     unilateral statement that the comprehensive package
     encompasses any suspect site in North Korea.
       Plutonium: To bring North Korea promptly into compliance
     with IAEA safeguards, we need to prepare for IAEA inspections
     under the agreement. North Korean cooperation in preserving
     the historical record of its past nuclear activities is
     critical. In addition, a new bargain should include early
     removal from North Korea of the nuclear spent fuel currently
     in storage at Yongbyon.
       Quid pro quo: Accelerating the process of resolving site
     questions, and the issue of IAEA compliance, could likely
     require a U.S. commitment to expedite the construction of the
     two light-water reactors, and negotiation of a United States-
     North Korean nuclear cooperation agreement.
       2. Missiles: North Korean missiles have become a far more
     prominent problem that was the case when the Agreed Framework
     was signed. It implicitly puts the missile problem on the
     agenda. Our near-term objectives are to end testing and
     exports, and, over the long term, to obtain North Korean
     adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime limits.
     However, if missile exports continue and the United States
     can identify them, we should do what we can to intercept
     those shipments. We will make it clear that we will act under
     the UN Charter's right of self-defense.
       3. Conventional threat: The United States should table a
     proposal for confidence building measures to begin a process
     aimed at reciprocal conventional force reductions. Any new
     peace mechanism should be linked to the reduction of the
     conventional threat.
       4. Food/economic assistance/sanctions: The United States
     should continue to provide some humanitarian food and medical
     aid with the caveat of increased transparency on
     distribution. But, our emphasis would be on assisting North
     Korean economic restructuring. We would support actions that
     open its economy to market forces. We are prepared to further
     ease sanctions and support its membership in the
     international financial institutions, recognizing that this
     requires change on the part of Pyongyang. If the North takes
     the necessary steps, the United States, with its allies,
     should consider establishing a Korean reconstruction fund
     within the World Bank or Asian Development Bank.
       U.S. diplomacy must integrate Seoul's Engagement Policy
     (e.g., government approval of investment projects,
     particularly large industrial investment by major firms known
     as Chaebol) with the broad policy objectives of the
     comprehensive package.
       As a step-by-step roadmap to a more cooperative
     relationship, economic benefits beyond humanitarian aid
     should be phased in as North Korea implements threat
     reduction measures. In the context of an economic assistance
     package, the United States could consult with North Korea to
     review the energy component of the Agreed Framework to
     develop alternate energy sources.
       5. Security assurances: The United States, along with the
     Republic of Korea and Japan, should propose a six-party (the
     United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North
     Korea) meeting to deal with the security of North Korea. A
     multilateral commitment should be based on the pledges made
     in Kim Dae Jung's inaugural address--that we have no intent
     to implode North Korea, to absorb North Korea, or to force
     North Korea to change its political system. Assurances could
     run the gamut from a pledge of nonaggression to a commitment
     to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of North
     Korea. Our goal should be to foster an environment making it
     as easy as possible for Pyongyang to choose reform.
       The United States and its allies should make it clear that
     we are prepared to coexist with a less threatening regime in
     the North.
       6. Normalization: If North Korea satisfies our security
     concerns, the United States should be prepared to move toward
     full normalization of relations.

                         Should Diplomacy Fail

       The one enduring element of this initiative--irrespective
     of North Korea's response--is the reinforcing of U.S.
     leadership in maintaining stability and enhancing security in
     this critical region. The U.S. effort to strengthen security
     cooperation with our key allies--the Republic of Korea and
     Japan--is an integral part of this leadership and becomes
     even more central to regional security.
       The virtue of this initiative is that it will test North
     Korea's intentions, discover whether diplomacy holds any real
     possibility of yielding positive results, and, in the
     process, restore U.S. leadership. This would enable us to
     bolster a coalition to deter and contain North Korea. It is
     aimed at leaving Pyongyang significantly wore off than if it
     had chosen a future of cooperation on mutually beneficial
     terms.

Commentary

       Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to
     consider two alternative courses, neither of which is
     attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North
     Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications
     for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant
     uncertainties.
Commentary

       Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve
     a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to
     interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our
     posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position
     the United States and its allies to enforce ``red lines.''
       Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties
     associated with this option. To be considered, any such
     initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities,
     assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with
     our allies of the risks.
       We are under no illusions about the prospects for success
     of the comprehensive package outlined above. The issues are
     serious and the implications of a failure of diplomacy are
     profound.

provenance of this document



Hugh's diary entry - B52s on alert - 2003 Feb 05 Wednesday


Hugh's diary entry - entry for the analysis of this report.

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